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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of banks as main blockholders on a firm’s returns 
and on the concentration of ownership in the hands of the controlling blockholders. 
Compared with previous studies, we approach to this problem by taking into 
consideration the type of blockholders building up coalitions with banks for controlling 
a firm. This allows us to reconcile different results, reported in relevant literature, on the 
impact of banks’ ownership of a firm on its returns. In short, we argue that the effect is 
only negative when banks are the main blockholders or when they build up coalitions 
with other banks. We prove empirically our theoretical contentions making use of a 
sample of Spanish firms for the period 1996-2000. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the literature on ownership structure has broadened its main focus by considering not 
only agency problems between managers and shareholders 2, but also those conflicts that emerge 
between large shareholders and minority shareholders (Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Bloch and Hege, 
2001; Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Röel, 1998). Large shareholders want to gain control in order to 
enforce decisions that give them some separate rents (private benefits of control) at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Thus, the investigation of internal as well as external mechanisms to prevent 
this kind of behavior is a major issue. In this paper, we focus on internal mechanisms and we study 
how specific characteristics of blockholders affect the firm’s returns. 
The literature on this subject departs from a vision of ownership concentration which comprises 
one major blockholder and a diverse group of small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985 and Berglöf, 1990). In this context is not possible to address strategic issues like the 
formation of coalitions between the main blockholders and their effects on a firm’s policy. 
Fortunately, this shortcoming has been overcome in some recent papers (Bloch and Hege, 2001; 
Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) and books (Morck, 2000), by modelling 
the presence of different blockholders in concentrated ownership structures. Common factor in all 
these studies is the emergence of different effects that may protect minority shareholders from 
expropriation by main blockholders. In particular, two opposite effects are described. Firstly, a 
bargaining effect that accounts for the difficulty in reaching agreements among different main 
blockholders that require a firm to follow specific and, in some occasions, opposite policies in order to 
enjoy particular private benefits of control. These value-decreasing policies, when they are mutually 
exclusive, come out as an implicit protection for the minority. Secondly, a disagreement effect which 
is related to the difficulty in agree on investments in some positive net present value projects. This 
underinvestment problem generally appears when a large number of blockholders control a firm. 
Recently, in Spain there has been some debate about the advantages and disadvantages of having 
“núcleos duros”, that means, groups of stable blockholders that control a firm. At the very centre of 
this debate is the role played by financial institutions 3 within these “nucleos duros”. This paper is an 
attempt to shed some light on the effects of a bank’s ownership on a firm’s returns by focusing on the 
type of controlling coalitions that banks can form with other blockholders. 
Spain comes out to be an interesting case in point, because traditionally banks have had a 
significant presence in a firm’s ownership. Recently enacted European rules, together with the 
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deregulation of Spanish financial system has amplified this phenomenon. Banks face more pressure 
from the financial markets and they have widened their traditional lending-borrowing activities to 
others like asset management and underwriting share issues. Within this context, banks’ ownership in 
a particular firm may be interpreted as evidence of their commitment to that firm. This may convince 
small investors to become shareholders in these firms via mutual funds or by buying shares issued by 
bank-backed companies. Obviously, this is of major interest for minority-expropriating banks. 
However, financial market pressure tends to hinder banks impulses to expropriate because the 
minority shareholders always retain the option to take their investment elsewhere with minor costs. 
Thus, within this setting a major issue is to examine the final effect of banks as blockholders on a 
firm’s returns. 
The literature on this subject has not yet reached a consensus on the effect of institutional 
ownership on a firm’s returns. There are some papers that find a negative effect (Hellwig, 1998; 
Morck, et al, 2000; Giner and Salas, 1997; and Goergen et al., 2003). Other papers do not find a clear-
cut relationship (Prowse, 1992; Zoido, 1998, using accounting measures). Finally, there is a strand of 
the literature that describes a positive relationship, (Cable, 1985; Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Boehmer 
2000; and Zoido, 1998 4), Hence, the debate is open and there is no conclusive evidence  on what the 
real effect could be. 
This paper contributes to this debate by typifying a firm’s main blockholders (individual, 
corporations, families, banks) together with their stockholdings. The aim is to inspect whether the 
coalitions of banks with other specific blockholders is the ultimate determinant of banks effect on a 
firm’s profitability. Our conjecture is that, structures that contain combinations of banks, 
independently of the stake, are particularly harmful because of their strong tendency to expropriate to 
minority shareholders. This is so for three reasons. Firstly, there is a natural convergence of interests 
among banks over the definition of policies in order to enjoy greater private benefits of control. 
Secondly, banks can easily reach a consensus because they can choose from a wide range of possible 
actions that bring these private benefits. These include the ability to oblige a firm to buy several 
services (insurance, payments management, ...) at prices above market rates. Lastly, banks may also 
control a firm, although do not hold a significant stake, by acting as representatives of other minority 
shareholders. This allows them to bear low costs derived from their expropriating activities. 
By the same token, when the other blockholders that collude with banks to control a firm are 
more heterogeneous, there is  lower incentive  to expropriate. In that case, the presence of banks may 
not be so damaging to a firm’s returns. 
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We test our theoretical contentions by carrying out an empirical investigation with a sample of 
Spanish firms for the period 1996-2000. We find that the results, making use of accounting data as 
well as market data, confirms in essence our main conjecture: A bank as the main blockholder, 
especially in concert with other banks, has a negative impact on a firm’s returns. Also, we find that 
these coalitions formed by banks have lower stakes. This is a clear signal that these kind of coalitions 
aims to expropriate. They minimize their expropriating costs by reducing their controlling stake. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
underpinnings as well as the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3, some descriptive analysis is shown. 
Section 4 displays the econometric study. In section 5, an analysis of robustness is carried out making 
use of market data. The paper ends with some final remarks. 
 
2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
When different blockholders control a firm, the process of decision-making is influenced by 
different effects. First, there is a bargaining effect, which is positive-, and reflects the possible 
difficulties that a set of blockholders may face when to agree on expropriating the minority. This is 
especially relevant when the main blockholders are not homogeneous as their particular interests are 
more difficult to converge. This feature protects the minority from the expropriating actions of the 
main blockholders. The second effect is the disagreement effect. This is responsible for the rejection of 
some positive net present value (NPV) projects because of the difficulty in getting blockholders to 
agree on several value-enhancing actions. This is the “negative side” of disagreement (Gomes and 
Novaes 2001). 
Within this scheme, it is in the interest of main blockholders to design controlling structures with 
high enough homogeneity so as to agree on positive NPV projects that generate private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Natural candidates for these homogeneous structures are those 
comprising banks. They are three factors that may justify banks’ expropriating behavior, together with 
other banks as a firm’s main blockholders. First, banks are relatively homogeneous institutions, this is 
especially so for those that participate in a firm’s ownership. This favors a consensus on the actions to 
achieve private benefits. Second, they can also overcome potential disagreements with other 
blockholders to expropriate minority shareholders, because they have access to a wide range of 
perquisites, such as the management of a firm’s payments or the supply of services like insurance or 
consultancy at a premium above the market price. And finally, they internalize a low proportion of the 
expropriating costs because they may control a firm with a low stake. Banks, in general, have more 
power than that derived from their stakes because they hold the representation of some minority 
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shareholders who have close links (i.e. long-term depositors). This provides banks with more muscle 
to influence a firm’s decisions in the direction of their own interests. 
Along these lines, Hellwig (1998) shows how banks tend to collude with a firm’s executive 
board members against non-executive members who are, in principle more eager to protect minority 
blockholders. Also, Goergen et al (2003) finds that those firms with banks in their ownership structure 
pay lower dividends. This is a signal of banks expropriating intentions. However, Edwards and Nibler 
(2000), shows that although banks may influence corporate governance, in practice, they do not play a 
role in the governance of large German firms which is distinct from that of other types of large 
shareholders. Our argument is that this may only be true when banks collude with other types of 
blockholders to control a firm, but not when they collude with other banks. 
The combination of the previous features leads us to propose as our main theoretical contention 
that when banks are the main blockholders, there is more willingness to expropriate minority 
shareholders. This is especially true when banks collude with other banks. 
This kind of bank expropriating behavior should be reflected in the stake of the controlling 
blockholders as well as on a firm’s returns. We are going to test our main theoretical contention 
making use of these variables. 
· Banks are expected to control the firm (and undertake expropriating actions) with as low a 
stake as possible. This is to minimize expropriating costs necessary to fully enjoy private benefits. 
Thus, what is optimal for a firm’s main blockholders is to retain the lowest possible controlling stake 
(close to 50%). 
In this way, we expect small blockholders’ stake in those bank-controlled firms as a signal of the 
banks eagerness to expropriate a firm’s minority. And, this signal should be especially clear when 
blockholders are homogeneous (bank-bank) rather than heterogeneous (bank-non-bank). Thus, we can 
state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The controlling stake of a firm with banks as main blockholders is lower than that 
of those other firms without banks in their ownership structure. This is especially clear when both 
main blockholders are banks.  
We can extract two consequences from hypothesis one. 
First, the presence of a bank as a firm’s main blockholder can be interpreted in terms of 
willingness to expropriate the minority. Thus, other banks may use this information to their own 
advantage and  may participate in these kinds of firms. The natural convergence of expropriating 
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objectives when both controlling blockholders are homogeneous reinforces this outcome. Thus, we 
expect a bank to form coalitions with other banks as a firm’s main blockholders. 
The second consequence of the controlling coalition low stake, when it is composed of banks, 
refers to the relative difference between the stakes of the two main blockholders. This difference 
should decrease with the overall blockholders’ stake (Bloch and Hege, 2001). We call this effect, the 
stake effect. This negative relationship may be justified because being the second in a coalition of two 
blockholders is like having an implicit option of becoming the controlling main shareholder in the 
future. From this view point, when the stake of the two main blockholders is low (the case of 
coalitions of bank-bank), it may make perfect sense for the second blockholder to have a significantly 
lower stake than that of the main shareholder. In this case, this low stake has a high option value 
because there is still a significant probability to become the main blockholder in the future by 
negotiating with minority shareholders. 
However, opposite to this stake effect , there is another effect, expropriating effect. This emerges 
when we take into consideration our main theoretical contention, that is, the high eagerness of banks to 
expropriate minority shareholders. In this situation, when both blockholders are banks, we expect that 
the homogeneity in their type should be translated into similarity in the size of the stakes. Otherwise, 
there is high blockholder competition to win minority favour (Bloch and Hege, 2001) and, 
consequently, less scope to expropriate minority shareholders. This cannot be compatible with a highly 
expropriating environment which is what we expect when there are two banks as main blockholders. 
In conclusion, when the expropriating effect is higher (lower) than the stake effect, those coalitions of 
two banks as main blockholders should be more (less) symmetric in their stakes than their 
counterparts with only one bank or no banks at all. 
· A second dimension that is worth exploring, in connection with our main theoretical 
contention, is a firm’s returns. There is not consensus on the effect of bank stockholding on a firm’s 
returns. Several studies like Giner and Salas (1997), for Spain; Morck et al (2000) 5; Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) 6, for Japan, suggest the existence of a negative relationship. Other studies, like Zoido 
(1998) making use of a sample of Spanish listed firms; Cable, (1985), Gorton and Schmid, (2000) for 
Germany; and Hoshi et al. (1990, 91) for Japan, show the existence of a positive relationship. Finally, 
there are papers like Zoido (1998) 7 for Spain, and Prowse (1992) 8 for Japan where no clear-cut  
relationship is found. 
In order to reconcile this wide range of results our conjecture is to incorporate the type of 
blockholder accompanying banks in the controlling coalition as the ultimate determinant of the effect 
of bank’s ownership on a firm’s returns. 
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There are different reasons why banks may have a positive effect on a firm’s return. First, they 
are specialist in monitoring and can save monitoring costs by bearing this responsibility on behalf of 
other shareholders (Diamond, 1984). Second, they are stable blockholders and may provide firms with 
some hedging against different types of shocks (Allen and Gale, 2001; Von Thadden, 1995). Third, 
banks when combining their role as shareholders with that of debtholders may be more willing to 
renegotiate debt contracts when a firm has some financial difficulties (Berlin et. al, 1996). 
Also, there are other reasons that may justify a negative relationship. First, they reduce 
managerial entrepreneur incentives (Gertner et al., 1994). And second, banks may translate their high 
bargaining power, as lenders, to reduce firm’s investment intensity (Rajan, 1992), and as blockholders, 
to extract some private benefits of control at the expense of the minority. 
Our contention is that the negative expropriating incentives may outweigh the previous positive 
effects when banks are allied with other banks to control a firm. We provided above three reasons for 
such a result, when we explained banks expropriating eagerness. Also, the reduction in the stake of 
banks as controlling blockholders that we expect (hypothesis 1) should reinforce the negative impact 
of banks as blockholders in coalition with other banks, on a firm’s returns. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2A: The presence of banks as blockholders, especially, when part of homogeneous 
structures with other banks, may have a harmful effect on a firm’s returns.  
Finally, once we compare heterogeneous blockholder structures composed of banks and non-
banks, we expect different results contingent on the type of main blockholders. In particular, structures 
with a bank as the leading shareholder should generate more intensive expropriating policies in 
comparison to those coalition structures with a bank as the second main blockholder. In the former 
case, a bank as a leader has high bargaining power, especially when the stake they are representing is 
taken into consideration. This allows them to impose expropriating actions and bypassing contrary 
opinions from other non-bank blockholders in this heterogeneous structure. This is consistent with 
what Boehmer (2000) finds making use of a sample of German bidder firms. This author finds that 
takeovers only increase the value of an acquiring firm that has banks as blockholders, if bank control 
is counterbalanced by another large shareholder. Also, Boehmer’s study shows that the worst 
takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions. This is 
precisely what we state in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2B: In heterogeneous controlling structures composed of banks and non banks as 
blockholders, the presence of a bank as the largest blockholder is especially negative for a firm’s 
returns. 
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As a final synthesis, the scheme that we have in mind is as follows: 
SCHEME 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  DATA BASE AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
3.1. The Data  
We carry out our empirical analysis making use of a sample of firms for the period 1996-2000. 
This sample is extracted from the SABE database (Sistema de Análisis de Balances de Empresas 
Españolas). This database is composed of more than 200,000 Spanish firms and it is compiled by 
Bureau Van Dijk. It provides annual information of balance sheet, income statements and other 
complementary information like a firm’s ownership. It covers companies of all sizes and all economic 
sectors. We have focused on those firms with information of their ownership and that have been 
filtered 9. The final outcome is an unbalanced panel data of 4,435 firms with 12,629 observations. 
It is worth noting that in 25.94% of the cases there is only one blockholder, and in 64.65% the 
main shareholder has control (with a stake higher than 50%). This is preliminary evidence of the high 
ownership concentration of Spanish firms, which is in line with what other authors have found (Crespí, 
1998; Galvé and Salas, 1994). In the next section, we present more detailed information on the 
ownership structure of Spanish firms emphasizing the role played by banks. 
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3.2. Descriptive Evidence 
A/ Ownership structure of Spanish firms: The presence of banks 
To begin with, we present some evidence of the average number of blockholders required to 
control a firm (Figure 1). We find that in most of the cases (80.5%) a single shareholder has a 
sufficiently large stake to control a firm. And, only in 5.40% of the total cases, more than two 
blockholders are required to ensure a firm’s control. Also, the average stake of the main shareholder is 
68.96% while that of the second main shareholder is 11.94%. Hence, it makes perfect sense to focus 
on the two main shareholders as a firm’s controlling blockholders 10. 
FIGURE 1 
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Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution and type of the two main shareholders. We can appreciate 
the relevance of cross-shareholdings among firms (in 88% of the cases, the main blockholder is 
another firm, and in 81% of the companies the second main blockholder is also a firm). Also, there is 
an important presence of individuals in a firm’s ownership, which corresponds to family-owned 
firms11. Finally, financial institutions show some presence, 2% of the cases as the main shareholders 
and 5% as the second main shareholder. 
FIGURE  2                                                                        FIGURE 3 
Category of the main shareholder
88%
6%1%2%3%
individual
company
state
finacial inst
foreign
 
Category of the second main 
shareholder
12%
81%
2% 5% 0% individual
company
state
financial
institution
foreign
 
 
 11 
FIRMS WITH BANKS AS MAIN SHAREHOLDERS 
Once we focus on those firms with financial institutions holding one of the two main stakes 
(2,76% of the firms), Table I shows its distribution divided between banks and Saving & Loans: 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS SHAREHOLDERS 
  MAIN 
SHAREHOLDER 
SECOND MAIN 
SHAREHOLDER 
ONE OF THE TEN 
LARGEST 
SHAREHOLDERS 
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 
1,44% 
(182 obs.) 
1,32% 
(167 obs.) 
3,83% 
(484 obs.) 
Banks 61,54% 58,68%  
Saving & Loans  38,46% 41,32%  
 
We find that the presence of banks is limited (484 observations), and in 70% of these cases, a 
financial institution is also one of the two main shareholders. Thus, we can state that financial 
institutions have controlling ambitions when they decide on becoming a blockholder. And, by type, 
banks have more presence than Saving & Loans as main blockholders. 
A more detailed analysis by size of those companies that have banks as one of their ten largest 
blockholders is displayed in Table II. Company size is defined taking into account the number of 
employees: small less than 50; medium, between 50 and 200 and large, more than 200. 
Table II 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS WITH FINANCIAL INSITUTIONS AS SHAREHOLDERS 
 SMALL MEDIUM LARGE 
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 26.03% 30.17% 43.8% 
BB=1 23,68 23.68 52.63 
BNB=1 40.28 39.58 20.14 
NBB=1 13.95 31.01 55.04 
NBNB=1 42.88 41.36 15.76 
See BOX I for the definition of BB, BNB, NBB and NBNB. 
Table II shows that financial institutions prefer to invest in large firms, especially when they are 
the second- largest blockholder (NBB=1) or when they are accompanied by other banks as the two 
main shareholders (BB=1). Note that in large firms there is separation of ownership and control and 
the potential expropriation problem seems to be more relevant.  
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Considering the analys is by sector (not reported), we have found that financial institutions invest 
especially in the housing sector where structure BB=1 appears in 63.16% of the cases. This sector in 
Spain is linked to the possibility of important perquisites. Housing is tied to different economic 
activities, a factor that makes it attractive to furthering a particular blockholder’s individual interest. 
Summing up, we have found that financial institutions seem to participate in those firms and in 
those sectors where we can expect expropriation problems to be more severe. 
B/ Banks in coalitions of main blockholders  
Having investigated the type of firms where financial institutions hold stakes, we move a step 
further inside the firm to describe the type of coalitions that banks 12 form with other blockholders in 
order to control a firm. In BOX I, we define the variables that characterize those different coalitions 
between the two main blockholders. 
BOX I 
Types of coalitions among the two main blockholders  
Bank1 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the main shareholder is a bank, and O otherwise. 
Bank2 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the second- largest shareholder is a bank, and O otherwise. 
BB=1 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the two largest shareholders are banks, and O otherwise. 
BNB=1 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the main shareholder is a bank but 
the second largest is not a bank, and 0 otherwise. 
NBB=1 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the second- largest shareholder is a 
bank but the largest one is not a bank, and 0 otherwise. 
NBNB=1 Dummy variable that takes value 1 if two main shareholders are not banks, and O otherwise. 
 
In Table III, we separate the frequency of appearance of those different coalitions that involve 
banks as one of the two main blockholders. 
TABLE III 
TYPE OF STRUCTURES WITH BANKS  
AS THE TWO MAIN BLOCKHOLDERS 
 % Total sample 
BB=1 0.3% (38 firms) 
BB=0 97% (12591 firms) 
BNB=1 or NBB=1 2.16% (273 firms) 
   BNB=1    1.14%  (144 firms) 
   NBB=1    1.02%  (129 firms) 
See Box I for the definition of variables 
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We observe that there are more firms with a bank as the main shareholder, than as the second 
largest one. These results reveal, consistently with what we have mentioned before, that financial 
institutions prefer to adopt a controlling role when they decide participating in a firm’s ownership. 
Along these lines, it is worth checking whether the presence of a bank lures other banks to 
become one of a firm’s blockholders. Table IV addresses this issue and computes conditional 
probabilities of the presence of banks depending on another bank’s presence. 
TABLE IV 
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF A BANK PRESENCE 
DEPENDING ON ANOTHER BANKS PRESENCE 1  
 Bank1=1 Bank1=0 P-value  2  
Probability of 
Bank2=1 if 
20.8% 1.04% (0.00) 
 Bank2=1 Bank2=0  
Probability of 
Bank1=1 if 
22.75% 1.15% (0.00) 
1See Box I for the definition of variables  
2 We have conducted Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
Table IV clearly shows that the presence of a bank in a firm’s ownership structure, independently 
of whether it is the main or the second largest shareholder, triggers other banks to also become 
significant blockholders. Thus, it seems that banks tend to form coalitions with other banks rather than 
with non-banks. We may interpret, relying on our theoretical underpinnings, that this may reflect the 
greater eagerness to expropriate of banks as blockholders in homogenous structures (BB=1). The 
presence of banks seems to be a signalling to other banks of the possibility to undertake expropriating 
action. This result is going to be confirmed in the econometric analysis. 
 
C/ Banks stockholdings  
As mentioned in the theoretical section, the potentially expropriating behavior of banks should 
be reflected in two dimensions: The main blockholder’s stake and the firm’s returns. Thus, it is worth 
studying the main blockholders stake of firms where banks are blockholders and compare it with those 
that are not. 
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Table V 
PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP HOLD BY THE TWO LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS 
  
TOTAL SAMPLE 
FIRMS WITH AT 
LEAST ONE BANK AS A 
SHAREHOLDER 
FIRMS WITH A BANK 
AS THE LARGEST 
SHAREHOLDER 
 TOTAL SMALL 2 LARGE 2  TOTAL SMALL 2  LARGE 2  TOTAL SMALL 2 LARGE 2  
1ST SHOLDER 1  68.97 67.21 74.81*** 47.5 52.4 39.46*** 53.2 65.8 28.69*** 
2 ND SHOLDER 1 11.95 12.82 9.49*** 12.8 13.3 12.1 11.3 11.5 13.05 
OWN2 3  80.92 80.03 84.30*** 60.3 65.7 52.56*** 64.5 77.3 41.74*** 
1 *** 99% of statistical significance of the mean comparing large and small firms. 
2  Small less than 50 employees; Large, more than 200 employees. 
3 OWN2 is the sum of the stakes of the two main shareholders 
 
Table V shows that the two main blockholder’s stake for those firms that have banks as 
shareholders (60.3%) is significantly lower than that for the average firm (80.92%). This is 
especially true for large firms, and also when a bank is the main shareholder. In that case the two 
main shareholder’s stake is 41.74% whereas for the average firm is 84.3%. These results seem to be 
consistent with the idea that banks tend to expropriate and reduce their stake in order to minimize 
expropriation costs.  
When we focus on different combinations of blockholders among the two main ones, Table 
VI shows that a coalition of both banks (BB=1) has a lower stake than combinations of banks with 
non-banks, and this latter stake is also lower than that of coalitions composed of non-banks as 
shareholders (81.33%). All this is consistent with our theoretical contentions. 
TABLE VI 
MEASURES OF THE STAKE OF THE MAIN BLOCKHOLDERS 
 BB=1 BNB=1 NBB=1 NBNB 3  
OWN2 1  48.39 68.65 64.87 81.33 
OWN1 2  39.54 56.75 52.86 69.37 
1
OWN2 is the sum of the stakes of the two main shareholders 
2
OWN1 is the stake of the main shareholder 
3
We have conducted Mann-Whitney tests and all are significantly lower than NBNB 
 
Finally, we move a step further, and inspect the distribution of the stake between the two main 
blockholders. Table VII reports these figures for different coalitions of main blockholders. 
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TABLE VII 
DIFFERENCES IN THE OWNERSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS 1  
 BNB OR NBB BB NBNB=1 P-value  
DIFOWN 2  0.56 0.44 0.67 0.00 
 BNB NBB    
DIFOWN 2  0.55 0.58   0.56 
1See BOX 1 for the definition of the variables 
2 DIFOWN is the ratio of the difference between the stakes of the two largest to the sum of that stakes. 
From Table VII we can state that there is more symmetry in the stake of the two main 
shareholders when both of them are banks than in other combinations of blockholders. This result 
ensures that the expropriating effect, as we called it in the theoretical section, is higher than the stake 
effect. This latter effect (Bloch and Hege, 2001), should justify larger relative differences between the 
stakes of blockholders in coalitions with an overall low stake (i.e. BB=1). This represents additional 
evidence of the banks’ eagerness to expropriate in controlling coalition with other banks. 
D/ The effects of bank ownership on ROA 
In this section, we conduct an analysis of a firm’s returns, contingent on the presence of banks in 
its ownership structure. We use two measures to characterize a firm’s returns: ROA (return on assets) 
and the Q-ratio (it means market-to-book ratio). As controlling structure, we take the combination of 
non-banks (NBNB). 
TABLE VIII 
MEASURES OF A FIRM’S RETURNS FOR DIFFERENT COALITIONS 
AMONG THE MAIN BLOCKHOLDERS 
 BB=1 4,3  BNB=1 4,3  NBB=1 4,3  NBNB 4,3  
ROA1 1  
9.591 
(0,744) 
6.722 
(0.063) 
7.917 
(0.243) 
8.618 
 
Q-RATIO1 2  
5.805 
(0.830) 
5.873 
(0.551) 
5.571 
(0.807) 
6.820 
 
1ROA1= the ratio of earning before interests and taxes to a firm’s assets , advanced by one  
   period. 
2 Q-RATIO1 = the ratio of the share price to a firm’s internal funds per share, advanced by 
    one period. 
3  See BOX 1 for the definition of the BB, BNB, NBB, NBNB variables 
4 In parenthesis the p-values of the Mann-Whitney tests with respect to NBNB coefficient. 
The data reveals that ROA advanced by one period is significantly lower in those structures that 
include a bank as the main blockholder and a non-bank as the second main blockholder. This result 
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will be confirmed in the following econometric analysis. Once we use market measures of a firm’s 
returns, Q-ratio is lower, although non-significant, in those structures that incorporate a bank, in 
comparison to the controlling structure NBNB=1. 
Once we put together the stake dimension and the return dimension (Table IX), we find that the 
presence of banks has only relevant effects on a firm’s returns in those cases where their combined 
stake is low. If the stake is higher than the median for the sector (OWN2 HIGH), the costs seem to 
discourage expropriation, independently of the type of blockholder. Next, once we focus on those 
firms with banks as main blockholders (columns 1 and 3), we observe that reductions in their 
blockholder’s stake generate a significant reduction on a firm’s returns. This is not true when banks 
are not present in a firm’s ownership. The combination of results of Table V (low stake for those 
controlling coalition composed of banks) and Table IX results, leads us to suggest the existence of a 
negative effect on a firm’s returns due to the presence of banks as main blockholders. 
Table IX 
MEASURES OF A FIRM’S RETURN CONTINGENT ON STAKE AND BANKS ’ PARTICIPATION 
 
WITH 
BANK 
PRESENCE 
ROA1 1  
WITHOUT 
BANK 
PRESENCE 
ROA1 1  
P value 4  
WITH 
BANK 
PRESENCE 
Q1 2  
WITHOUT 
BANK 
PRESENCE 
Q1 2  
P value 4  
OWN2 3  
LOW 
6.508 9.231 3.711 
(0.000) 
5.410 5.389 0.284 
(0.776) 
OWN2 3  
HIGH 
9.292 8.294 0.887 (0.375) 6.841 7.604 
0.571 
(0.568) 
P-value  4 2.264 (0.024) 
3.480 
(0.000) 
 1.397 
(0.162) 
0.965 
(0.334) 
 
1ROA1= the ratio of earning before interests and taxes to a firm’s assets, advanced by one period. 
2 Q-RATIO1 = the ratio of the share price to a firm’s internal funds per share, advanced by one period. 
3 OWN2 HIGH (LOW) if the sum of the stake of the two largest stakeholders when it is  higher (lower) than the 
median for the sector. 
4 In parenthesis the p-values of the Mann-Whitney mean tests . 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS 
4.1/ Methodology 
The previous descriptive evidence suggests that banks, especially when they hold the main stake 
in a firm, expropriate minority shareholders. 
To investigate this issue in more depth level, we conduct a two-equation estimation on a firm’s 
returns as well as on the main shareholders’ stake. We recognize the possible endogeneity between 
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both variables by allowing each dependent variable in one equation to enter as an independent variable 
in the other equation. The scheme we have in mind is that shown in Scheme 1.  
We measure the stake of two main blockholders in a firm with variable OWN2, which is simply 
the sum of its stakes. Concerning to firm’s returns, we use two measures. Firstly, the ROA, which is 
the ratio of earnings, before interest, and taxes to a firm’s assets. Secondly, the Q-ratio, which is the 
ratio of the share price to internal funds per share. 
We separate the effects of the presence of banks on a firm’s ownership and returns by 
introducing six different dummy variables that are explained in Box II. These variables characterize 
those different situations where there is a variation in a firm’s ownership in such a way that banks 
become the firm’s main blockholders: 
BOX II 
MAIN VARIABLES 
NBNB_BB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when BB=1 and zero when NBNB=1. 
NBNB_BNB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when BNB=1 and zero when NBNB=1. 
NBNB_NBB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when NBB=1 and zero when NBNB=1. 
NBB_BB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when BB=1 and zero when NBB=1. 
BNB_BB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when BB=1 and zero when BNB=1. 
NBB_BNB It is a dummy that is equal to 1 when BNB=1 and zero when NBB=1. 
See in Box I the definitions of BB, BNB, NBB and NBNB. 
 
With the variables in BOX II, we can study the effects that banks generate contingent on the type 
of the accompanying blockholders, when the formers buy a significant stake in a firm. We consider six 
different specifications, one for each variable. They can be summarized in the following scheme: 
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SCHEME II 
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE TWO MA IN BLOCKHOLDERS 
INVOLVING BANKS AS MAIN BLOCKHOLDERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each specification incorporates the same set of control variables that are quite familiar with in 
this literature (Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Morck et al (1988)). 
First, when concentrating on the ten main blockholders, the control variable (BANKSOWN) 
reflects the bank stake in a firm. This aims to focus those effects on the overall stake caused 
specifically by changes on ownership by banks. Second, size effects are captured by variable 
LSALES, which is a measure of a firm’s overall sales on a log scale. Third, to control for reputation, 
we introduce a firm’s age (AGE). Fourth, variable INTANG defined as the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets as a control for a firm’s potential growth. Investment in intangibles is as a major 
determinant of a firm’s returns. We also incorporate a variable of financial structure (DEQUITY) that 
is defined as the ratio of debt to total assets. Finally, we also introduce temporal and sectorial dummy 
variables (Dummies). Thus, the specification is as follows: 
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Where ite  is the error term and has a normal distribution with zero mean and a s
2 variance. 
Variable ih  accounts for the unobservable heterogeneity. 
The previous equation synthesizes the six estimations we carry out. 
The second equation, which is linked to the previous one because it incorporates OWN2 as an 
independent variable, is intended to estimate the effect on a firm’s returns when banks buy a 
significant stake in a firm. The equation we propose is quite similar to the previous one but without 
introducing BANKSOWN. This allows overcoming potential identification issues. A second 
remarkable feature is that we advance dependent variable ROA by one period. This is so as to avoid 
the kind of endogeneity problems that we are going to discuss later. Also, this recognizes the possible 
temporal lag that can induce a variation in a firm’s returns when there is a change in its ownership 
structure. 
Summarizing, the second specification we propose is:  
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Where, as equation (1), it'e  is the error term, which has a normal distribution with zero mean and 
a s2 variance. Variable i'h  accounts for the unobservable heterogeneity. 
We have to point out that both estimations are restricted to those firms where the stake of the 
main shareholders is lower than 50%. The aim is to enrich the problem and avoid situations where 
there is no need for coalitions in order to control a firm. 
There are two additional comments. First, we allow for the existence of some unobservable 
heterogeneity potentially correlated with independent variables 13. To overcome this problem we use 
the within group estimation when the Hausman 14 test reveals the existence of such a  problem. We 
should mention that this source of endogeneity is not observed in any estimation of the OWN2 
variable, while it is for the estimations of ROA. This latter result is in accordance with Himmelberg et 
al (1999). 
Second, we allow for a second endogeneity problem. This is linked to the possibility that a firm’s 
ROA drives blockholders to change their stake in a firm. In that case, the estimation of a firm’s returns 
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would be biased. To tackle this problem, which is especially harmful when it is combined with the 
previous endogeneity problem, we advance variable ROA by one period. Also, for completeness we 
have conducted endogeneity tests in the OWN2 estimation, with negative results. It is important to test 
for the existence of endogeneity otherwise the estimation would be inconsistent 15. 
4.2. Results 
The results of equation (1) are presented in Table X, while those of equation (2) are shown in 
Table XI. Focusing on Table X, we separate column 1 from other columns because in the former case, 
we simply compare, on average, the effects of different ownership structures with that structure that 
does not involve banks (NBNB). In the remaining columns, there is a transitional analysis of specific 
changes between different ownership structures that incorporate one or two banks as the main 
blockholders. These situations are described by means of the dummy variables defined in Box II. All 
estimations have the same control variables described in the methodological part. Finally, we have  
conducted two types of endogeneity tests. Firstly, Hausman tests to control for the endogeneity linked 
to the unobservable heterogeneity (fixed effects). Secondly, we implement a Sargan test in the 
estimations of OWN2 to control for the possible correlation between the error term, not directly linked 
to the unobservable heterogeneity, and variable ROA of a firm’s returns (see footnote 15). In all 
estimations neither type of endogeneity has been found 16. 
 
[PUT TABLE X ABOUT HERE] 
 
Column 1 shows that those coalitions with two banks (BB=1) or one bank as one of the main 
blockholders (BNB=1 or NBB=1 17) are associated with lower stake by the two main blockholders in 
comparison to those other structures without banks (NBNB=1). This is in line with the idea that the 
presence of banks may generate expropriation and it is optimal for them to reduce their stake as a way 
to reduce expropriation costs 18. Also, once we incorporate dummy variables that reflect specific 
changes in the ownership structure (transitional analysis), the results are clearer except for the case 
NBNB_NBB 19. This fully supports Hypothesis 1 that postulates lower stake in controlling coalitions 
with banks in comparison with coalitions without banks 
It is interesting to stress that the negative effect on a firm’s ownership of the two main 
shareholders is particularly important in the following cases: 
a) When two banks become the main blockholders of a firm that initially did not have banks 
holding significant stakes (NBNB_BB with a coefficient -23.222). 
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b) When a bank becomes the main blockholder of a firm that initially did not have banks as their 
main blockholders (NBNB_BNB with a coefficient -11.520). 
These are situations where we expect pronounced eagerness to expropriate minority 
shareholders. This will be confirmed later in the estimation of a firm’s returns making use of market 
data (see Table XIII). 
Concerning the endogeneity issue, the non-significant result found suggests that variable OWN2 
is not going to be significant in the ROA estimations (see Table XI). Also, the results on ROA reveal 
that firms do not seem to adjust their ownership structure in response to their results (non-significant 
coefficient of ROA on OWN2 estimations). We should mention that several studies for the USA such 
as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find that firms do in fact change their ownership structure 
contingent on their return. These studies focus on US-listed companies where it is possible to change 
conveniently a firm’s ownership structure with low liquidity costs. In our database there are only 133 
of firms (3% of the original sample) that are listed on the stock market. This generates some rigidity 
that ends up translated as a persistence of ownership structure as time goes by.  
Finally, control variables show that banks’ ownership appears as part of concentrated ownership 
structures. This is consistent with the aforementioned idea that banks participate in a firm by playing a 
controlling role (i.e. holding one of the two largest stakes). 
The last significant variable is AGE. It shows that older firms have more “diluted” ownership. It 
seems natural that a firm is initially owned by few and the owners dilute its initial ownership as time 
goes by. 
The estimations on ROA are displayed in Table XI. In all cases we have taken dependent 
variable ROA advanced by one period as we have explained in the methodological section. We should 
mention that we have not taken control variable advanced by one period because this may generate 
additional endogeneity problems. Also, this should introduce an ad-hoc asymmetry between these 
controls and those dummy variables that reflect changes in a firm’s ownership structure. 
 
[PUT TABLE XI ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results of Table XI can be summarized as follows:  
1) In general, there is a negative effect on a firm’s return when a bank becomes its main 
blockholder. In that case, there are three possible ways to achieve this position. First, when a bank is 
the second main shareholder and remains so in this position, while another bank buys the firm’s main 
stake (NBB_BB). Second, when initially there are no banks as main blockholders and a bank becomes 
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the main shareholder (NBNB_BNB). Last, when the second main shareholder is a bank which then 
buys the largest stake (NBB_BNB). In the aforementioned situations, the first generates more negative 
effects than the second on a firm’s returns (coefficient of -.142 for NBB_BB, versus -.068 for 
NBNB_BNB), while the third has no impact. Thus, it seems that combined with the negative effect of 
the presence of banks as the main shareholder, there is a second effect that is linked to the structure 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous) of the controlling group. When the change is from a heterogeneous 
structure to a homogeneous one (NBB_BB), the effect is more negative than when the change is from 
a homogeneous to a heterogeneous one (NBNB_BNB). Thus, homogeneous structures are the more 
potentially expropriating. This fully supports hypothesis 2A and 2B. We should mention that all these 
effects are present only in the period after changes in the ownership structure but not present in the 
period when they are changed 20. 
2) We find a non-significant linkage between ROA and OWN2. This confirms the result found in 
the OWN2 estimation (Table X), revealing that firms do not adjust optimally their ownership 
structure21. Thus, it makes sense for banks to shape that structure to their own advantage at the expense 
of minority shareholders. Interestingly, this effect holds even when we introduce control variable 
OWN2. This means that the negative impact of banks on a firm’s returns does not rely on reductions in 
the controlling stake. It is the very present of banks in a firm’s controlling coalitions what generates 
such a negative outcome. And, this is particularly relevant when a bank becomes the main shareholder 
of a firm that has as another bank as the second main shareholder. This is the main argument of the 
article 22. 
      3) When we compare the situation (NBNB_BNB) with that (NBB_BNB), the coefficient is only 
negative in the first type of change. This reveals two things: first, the presence of a bank as the main 
shareholder is especially harmful when initially there were not banks as blockholders. Second, when 
the main blockholder sells its stake to a bank that is the second main blockholder, this seems to reveal 
that this bank was already expropriating the minority as the second main blockholder. In this case this 
change in the ownership structure does not produce any effect on ROA. 
     4) The incorporation of a bank as a firm’s blockholder has only non-negative effects on returns 
when it holds the second largest stake. This is in accordance with the aforementioned study of 
Boehmer (2000) making use of a sample of German bidder firms. He finds that takeovers only 
increase the value of an acquiring firm that has banks as blockholders, if bank control is 
counterbalanced by another large shareholder. 
      5) Advancing the results of market data (see Table XIII), when two banks become 
simultaneously the two main shareholders, there is a contemporaneous 23 reduction in a firm’s market 
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return. Markets react “immediately” and significantly to this particularly bad combination of 
shareholders. 
       6) Finally, concerning control variables: 
a) There is a significant effect of AGE. Older firms show more ROA. This is consistent with what 
we found in the OWN2 estimations where older firms have more diluted ownership. 
b) Size has a negative or a non-significant effect on ROA. This result may be justified by invoking 
information asymmetries linked to big firms. 
c) Leverage plays a positive or non-significant effect on a firm’s ROA. Free cash-flow theory of 
Jensen (1986) may justify this result as debt reduces the scope for managers to divest funds. 
From this result that demonstrates the banks expropriating behavior when they hold controlling 
stakes, we can recommend the use of retribution mechanism like share buy-backs to improve a firm’s 
efficiency. This is an attempt to buy shares from banks and distribute them to other types of 
blockholders or put them on the stockmarket. Preferably these other types of blockholders should be 
other firms with unrelated activities and/or listed ones. Interestingly Yeo et al. (2002) finds a strong 
positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings informativeness, which is 
a signal of blockholders low expropriating intentions. Also, Graham Jr and Lefanowicz (1999) shows 
that there is not a wealth transfer from the minority to the majority owners when blockholders are 
other publicly-traded companies. Thus, using share buy-backs is a natural way to promote market 
mechanism for corporate control that has been shown to be an effective means of reducing agency 
costs as Weir et al. (2002) shows for UK. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS: MARKET DATA 
To check the robustness of the previous results, we carry out a similar study but focusing on 
listed firms. This allows us to use market measures of a firm’s returns instead of accounting measures. 
In particular, the variable we use, Q, is defined as the market-to-book ratio (Q-ratio). 
Table XII shows the results of the estimation of the stake of the two main blockholders while in 
Table XIII we show the results of the determinants of a firm’s market returns. Due to the restricted 
number of listed firms, in some cases we conducted maximum-likelihood estimations (NBNB_BB) or 
simple regressions (NBNB_BNB, NBNB_NBB) instead of random-effect estimation. Also, in order to 
keep as many firms as possible (we have 133 listed firms), we have not rule out those firm where their 
largest stake is higher than 50%. This does not change substantially our sample as listed firms have 
diluted ownership (OWN2 has an average of 29.07%), and the stake of the main shareholder in almost 
all of them is lower than 50% (in 90% of the cases). 
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We treat the endogeneity issue in the usual way. First, we have conducted Hausman tests to 
check for the existence of unobservable heterogeneity correlated with independent variables (fixed 
effects). Second, contingent on the previous results, we have implemented tests of endogeneity not 
related to the unobservable heterogeneity. This latter test reveals the non-existence of such a 
problem24. 
 
[PUT TABLE XII ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table XII shows that banks as blockholder have, in general, negative effects on two main 
shareholders’ stake. This is especially true when a bank holds the largest stake and not the second-
largest one. However, different from the analysis using accounting data, in some specifications the 
coefficients are not significant. This is far from surprising, as listed firms have more diluted ownership 
than non- listed ones. In that case, the controlling group’s stake is quite low, and further reductions in 
that stake are less instrumental in reducing expropriating costs. 
The analysis of a firm’s returns with the market-to-book ratio (Table XIII) reveals that a bank as 
controlling blockholder has a negative effect on the market-to-book ratio, in those cases where there is 
also reduction in a firm’s controlling stake: 
First, when two banks buy the controlling stake of a firm without banks as its main shareholders 
(NBNB_BB), we find that markets react in the same period of the change in the ownership structure. 
We interpret this feature as a strong negative signal of potential expropriation risks. And, accordingly, 
markets react “quickly”. 
Second, there is also a negative reaction when a bank becomes the main blockholder of a firm 
without banks as blockholders (NBNB_BNB). In that case the effect on returns emerges in the next 
period. 
Some final comments concerning control variables are pertinent. First, some specifications show 
that smaller firms show a superior Q-ratio value (growth-firms with a high Q-ratio tend to be small). 
Second, there is a weak negative effect of the stake of the two main blockholders on a firm’s return. 
This does not coincide with the non-significant effect found using accounting measures. This result 
may be explained in terms of the lower stake in the hands of the two largest shareholders of listed 
firms (29.07%) in comparison with non- listed ones (80.92%). As OWN2 increases and approximates 
to 50%, there is more expropriation and, consequently, lower returns. Finally, we find some evidence 
of a negative impact of leverage on the Q-ratio. There is a wide amount of literature that shows a 
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negative relationship between a firm’s growth (positively related with Q-ratio) and its leverage. This is 
based on asset substitution problems.  
 
PUT TABLE XIII ABOUT HERE 
 
As a synthesis, we can draw the following figure  
SCHEME III 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN A FIRM’S OWNERSHIP CAUSED B Y BANKS ON RETURNS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, a relevant comment is in order. We can ask why there is so low proportion of firms with 
banks as the main blockholders (2,76% as the two largest blockholders) given our results. We can give 
two answers. First, a large proportion of firms in our sample are non-listed and small companies. This 
is the kind of illiquid asset highly penalized by bank regulation to invest in. Second, the incumbent 
blockholder (if not a bank), knows that banks are going to pursue their own private benefits. This 
makes that leading blockholder particularly wary about banks stockholdings. 
Neither blockholder is 
a bank (NBNB) 
(NE1NE2) 
 
Both main 
blockholders are 
banks (BB) 
Only the second 
blockholder is a bank  
(BNB) 
Only the main 
blockholder is a bank 
(BNB) 
Negative effect on 
Q and no effect 
on ROA Negative effect 
on ROA and no 
effect on Q 
Negative effect 
 on Q and ROA 
No effect 
No effect 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we have studied how the returns of a firm are affected by having banks as 
blockholders. We also have studied the stake of controlling coalition containing banks as well as the 
types of other blockholders they are more likely to collude with in order to control a firm. 
Our premise is that when financial institutions are the main blockholders they tend to expropriate 
a firm’s minority, especially when they collude with other financial institutions to achieve control. We 
base this statement on three factors. First, there is a natural convergence of interests when 
blockholders are homogeneous (i.e. banks). In that case, they can easily reach agreement on those 
specific actions required in order to enjoy private benefits at the expense of the minority. Second, 
banks as main blockholders have the possibility to choose from a wide range of actions in order to 
expropriate the minority. This facilitates the implementation of these actions. Third, banks may control 
a firm without owning large stakes. This is because they may represent other shareholders. This 
feature allows banks to impose a particular type of expropriating action and internalize low cost when 
there is disagreement with other secondary blockholders. 
The previous statement contains two basic hypotheses. First, there is a negative impact on a 
firm’s returns when banks participate as main blockholders in controlling coalitions. And, this effect is 
particularly damaging when banks collude with one and other. Second, consistently with the previous 
hypothesis, we expect that a firm’s controlling stake would be lower when the main blockholders are 
banks. Also, related to this latter result, we have argued that banks are more likely to take part in 
controlling coalitions with other banks rather than with other types of blockholders. Finally, we 
introduce some additional statements concerning the distribution of the stakes within a firm’s 
controlling coalitions.  
To test the previous hypotheses, we carried out an empirical study with a panel data sample of 
Spanish firms that covers the  period 1996-2000. This sample is extracted from the database SABE that 
is collected by Bureau Van Dijk. The results we find can be summarized as follows:  
1) There are two cases when banks on becoming blockholders generate negative returns. First, 
when a bank buys the main stake in a firm; this effect is particularly strong when the second main 
blockholder is also a bank. Second, when two banks together become the main blockholders of a firm 
that did not initially had banks as main blockholders. We should stress that this latter result is only 
found when we measure a firm’s returns making use of market data. 
2) When a bank buys the second- largest stake of a firm, it does not generate any negative effect 
on a firm’s returns. This is independent of who the main blockholder is. 
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3) The controlling coalitions that incorporate banks have lower stakes than those without banks. 
This feature is particularly significant when a bank is the main blockholder. 
4) Finally, banks tend to appear together with other banks as a firm’s main blockholders. And, 
in these kinds of structures, we observe a symmetrical distribution in their stakes. 
Previous results confirm our principal statement: a bank generally expropriates minority 
shareholders. This is true when it is a firm’s main blockholder and especially so when it acts 
accompanied with other banks. The presence of banks has no negative effects on a firm’s returns, only 
when it is the second- largest blockholder in a firm that does not have a bank as the main blockholder. 
 We feel confident that these results are valid because they are robust to accounting measure 
as well as market measures of a firm’s returns. However, one major drawback in our paper is that it 
does not address the question of indirect participations. This provides a blurred image of what the 
“real” ownership structure is. We should mention that it is quite common in Spain to find indirect 
participations of banks in different firms. Interestingly, this feature reinforces our main result because 
even underestimating expropriation costs by focusing on direct participations, banks follow value-
destroying expropriating policies. 
 Finally, some political recommendations can be extracted from our paper. First, firms should 
try to promote heterogeneity in the types of controlling blockholders. Second, they should try avoiding 
banks, Third, it is better to use share buy-backs instead of dividends as a retribution mechanism. This 
allows firms to buy stakes from one type of blockholders and distribute them to another type of 
blockholders or float them in the stockmarket. The investigation of the efficiency of this measure will 
be the subject of future research. 
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TABLE X 
EFFECTS ON OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 
BB 
-18.813*** 
(3.503) 
BNB 
-12.036*** 
(2.337) 
NBB 
-3.422** 
(1.704) 
 
NBNB_BB 
-23.222*** 
(5.182) 
 
NBNB_BNB 
-11.520*** 
(3.420) 
 
NBNB_NBB 
-2.724 
(1.880) 
 
NBB_BB 
-6.958*** 
(1.481) 
 
BNB_BB 
-6.293*** 
(1.639) 
 
NBB_BNB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-11.418*** 
(1.688) 
BANKSOWN 
0.380*** 
(0.083) 
0.238** 
(0.135) 
0.381*** 
(0.135) 
0.309*** 
(0.121) 
0.204** 
(0.098) 
0.296*** 
(0.059) 
0.813*** 
(0.113) 
LSALES 
-0.141 
(0.115) 
-0.128 
(0.126) 
-0.106 
(0.121) 
-0.118 
(0.124) 
-0.481 
(0.330) 
-0.014 
(0.145) 
-0.227 
(0.252) 
AGE 
-0.166*** 
(0.046) 
-0.157*** 
(0.048) 
-0.163*** 
(0.048) 
-0.170*** 
(0.048) 
-0.229** 
(0.127) 
0.021 
(0.099) 
-0.156 
(0.103) 
INTANG 
-6.319 
(4.421) 
-5.490 
(4.511) 
-5.566 
(4.498) 
-6.098 
(4.472) 
16.247 
(20.320) 
9.749 
(21.328) 
-50.107 
(31.587) 
DEQUITY 
0.366 
(1.033) 
0.255 
(1.057) 
0.409 
(1.052) 
0.303 
(1.051) 
-0.650 
(3.485) 
1.712 
(3.303) 
7.118 
(5.303) 
ROA 
1.292 
(2.292) 
1.235 
(2.406) 
1.073 
(2.378) 
1.602 
(2.386) 
13.365* 
(7.674) 
-10.699* 
(6.692) 
2.937 
(6.227) 
Fitness of the 
model2 
87.16 
(0.000) 
3681.43 
(0.000) 
3695.52 
(0.000) 
3707.88 
(0.000) 
66.44 
(0.000) 
297.55 
(0.000) 
90.58 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test3 
18.26 
(0.57) 
5.26 
(0.999) 
26.50 
(0.117) 
11.46 
(0.933) 
3.84 
(0.986) 
17.35 
(0.137) 
19.75 
(0.138) 
Endogeneity. 
Test4 
13.54 
(0.887) 
14.48 
(0.697) 
14.20 
(0.716) 
13.77 
(0.797) 
-6.11 
(1.000) 
-2.60 
(1.000) 
15.28 
(0.431) 
R2 2.94 2.037 2.14 1.698 31.27 70.574 61.58 
Observations 3301 3183 3218 3214 83 87 118 
1***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value  0.10. In parenthesis Standard Deviations. See the definition of the variables in the text. 
2 X2 statistics and p-values of fitness of the model tests. 
3 X2  statistics and p -value for the Hausman Test. 
4 X2  statistics and p -value for the Sargan Test (p-value>0.10 reveals that there is no endogeneity). 
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TABLE XI 
EFFECTS ON RETURNS  
 ROA11 ROA11 ROA11 ROA11 ROA11 ROA11 ROA11 
BB 
-0.011 
(0.044) 
BNB 
-0.032 
(0.027) 
NBB 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
 
NBNB_BB  
-0.055 
(0.078) 
 
NBNB_BNB  
-0.068** 
(0.036) 
 
NBNB_NBB  
-0.002 
(0.023) 
 
NBB_BB  
-0.142** 
(0.058) 
 
BNB_BB  
0.047 
(0.035) 
 
NBB_BNB  
 
 
 
 
 
0.027 
(0.021) 
LSALES 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
AGE 
-0.010* 
(0,006) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010** 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
INTANG 
0.017 
(0.067) 
0.009 
(0.067) 
0.014 
(0.067) 
0.005 
(0.067) 
2.549 
(1.280) 
-0.644 
(0.895) 
-0.393 
(0.399) 
DEQUITY 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.022** 
(0.013) 
0.144 
(0.124) 
-0.010 
(0.092) 
0.014 
(0.061) 
OWN2 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Fitness of the 
model2 
1.55 
(0.619) 
1.42 
(0.11) 
1.76 
(0.028) 
1.44 
(0.111) 
3.14 
(0.021) 
26.55 
(0.03) 
47.50 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
Test3 
54.41 
(0.000) 
52.56 
(0.000) 
54.74 
(0.000) 
61.72 
(0.000) 
34.72 
(0.000) 
5.67 
(0.773) 
10.62 
(0.388) 
R2 2.14 1.841 2.244 1.837 58.249 33.528 24.338 
Observations 2362 2272 2300 2298 62 64 90 
1***p-value 0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. In parenthesis Standard Deviations. See the definition of the 
variables in the text. 
2 Statistics and p-values of fitness of the models. In the fixed-effect estimation is the F statistics. For the random-
effect estimation it is the X2 statistics. 
3 X2  statistics and p -value for the Hausman test. 
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TABLE XII 
EFFECTS ON OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION FOR A SAMPLE OF SPANISH LISTED COMPANIES 
 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 2 OWN2 1 3 OWN2 1 3 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 OWN2 1 
BB 
-16.954*** 
(5.636) 
BNB 
-11.853*** 
(4.361) 
NBB 
-0.416 
(3.022) 
 
NBNB_BB 
-12.103* 
(7.654) 
 
NBNB_BNB  
-18.070*** 
(6.826) 
 
NBNB_NBB  
5.899 
(6.948) 
 
NBB_BB  
-7.137*** 
(1.808) 
  
BNB_BB  
2.610 
(3.080)  
NBB_BNB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-27.008 ** 
(5.434) 
BANKSOWN 
0.044 
(0.180) 
-0.641** 
(0.330) 
-0.415 
(0.333) 
-1.342*** 
(0.387) 
0.071 
(0.200) 
0.657*** 
(0.136) 
1.420*** 
(0.344) 
LSALES 
0.137 
(0.529) 
0.449 
(0.722) 
2.513 
(0.912) 
1.393 
(1.035) 
0.112 
(0.543) 
-0.037 
(0.493) 
0.779 
(1.017) 
AGE 
-0.058 
(0.104) 
-0.049 
(0.115) 
-0.127* 
(0.081) 
-0.131 
(0.112) 
-0.125 
(0.228) 
-0.232*** 
(0.071) 
0.434 
(1.151) 
INTANG 
-24.897 
(25.563) 
-32.547 
(26.872) 
-78.481** 
(36.794) 
-22.234 
(48.434) 
50.094 
(42.873) 
0.291 
(36.993) 
114.655 
(180.407) 
DEQUITY 
6.164 
(6.746) 
8.036 
(8.080) 
9.662 
(10.760) 
29.615** 
(14.222) 
-2.985 
(3.947) 
-4.353 
(5.006) 
-8.745 
(10.693) 
ROA 
-0.078 
(0.223) 
-0.084 
(0.279) 
0.592 
(0.411)  
0.045 
(0.115) 
-0.217 
(0.263) 
-0.019 
(0.408) 
ROA_1    
10.759 
(81.470)    
Fitness of the 
model4 
343.95 
(0.000) 
27.56 
(0.069) 
3.25 
(0.000) 
1.96 
(0.022) 
24.64 
(0.055) 
393.26 
(0.000) 
4.20 
(0.001) 
Hausman 
Test5 
17.38 
(0.429) 
7.65 
(0.937) 
19.36 
(0.198) 
7.61 
(0.938) 
1.53 
(0.998) 
-339.74 
(1.000) 
56.24 
(0.000) 
Endogeneity. 
Test6 
1.77 
(1.000) 
12.74 
(0.754) 
0.66 
(1.000) 
33.26 
(0.007) 
0.14 
(1.000) 
10.34 
(0.666) 
10.66 
(0.384) 
R2 23.42 2.225 29.15 26.37 26.069 80.803 65.990 
Observations 216 148 161 111 55 47 68 
1***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p -value  0.10. In parenthesis Standard Deviations. See the definition of the 
variables in the text. 
2 Maximum-likelihood estimation (to improve the fitness of the model). 
3 Simple regression (to improve the fitness of the model) 
4 Statistics and p-values of fitness of the models. In the fixed-effect estimation is the F statistics. For the random-
effect estimation it is the X2 statistics. 
5 X2  statistics and p -value for the Hausman test. 
6 X2  statistics and p -value for the Sargan Test (p-value>0.10 reveals that there is no endogeneity). 
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TABLE XIII 
EFFECTS ON RETURNS FOR A SAMPLE OF SPANISH LISTED COMPANES 
Q1 Q 1 2 Q1 1 Q 1 2 Q1 1 Q1 1 Q1 1 3 Q1 1 Q1 1 Q1 1 
BB -3,709
*  
(2.349) 
1.478 
(6.584)  
BNB -0.779 (1.548) 
-1.476 
(4.061)  
NBB -1.339 (1.118) 
-1.229 
(3.093)  
 
NBNB_BB   -6.654
** 
(3.448) 
-1.815 
(2.255) 
 
NBNB_BNB    -3.120
** 
(1.721) 
 
NBNB_NBB    -0.540 (1.503) 
 
NBB_BB    1.066 (10.070) 
 
BNB_BB    3.113 (3.591) 
 
NBB_BNB    
 
 
 
 
 1.947 (4.442) 
LSALES -1.765
*** 
(0.154) 
-2.614** 
(1.315) 
-1.908*** 
(0.219) 
0.577* 
(0.324) 
0.715*** 
(0.310) 
0.404 
(0.345) 
-6.370** 
(2.546) 
0.619 
(0.398) 
-5.567** 
(2.273) 
AGE 1.518
*** 
(0.545) 
1.920 
(1.942) 
1.817*** 
(0.615) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.032) 
2.419 
(1.808) 
-0.116* 
(0.065) 
2.739** 
(1.334) 
INTANG 16.493 
(10.580) 
-32.866 
(55.309) 
5.684 
(11.786) 
-8.477 
(17.916) 
-14.661 
(16.896) 
0.753 
(17.486) 
-44.023 
(451.470) 
-78.269 
(72.460) 
94.962 
(412.602) 
DEQUITY 3.677 
(2.708) 
-16.738** 
(7.784) 
3.175 
(3.518) 
-5.836* 
(3.646) 
-5.758* 
(3.547) 
-5.556 
(3.589) 
-16.455 
(16.071) 
-13.514 
(8.691) 
-21.325* 
(12.734) 
OWN2 -0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.094 
(0.094) 
-0.043 
(0.041) 
-0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.049* 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.029) 
-0.754 
(0.801) 
-0.228* 
(0.119) 
-0.176 
(0.166) 
Fitness of 
the model4 
14.87 
(0.000) 
2.85 
(0.002) 
9.19 
(0.000) 
37.85 
(0.002) 
28.53 
(0.027) 
22.24 
(0.136) 
2.98 
(0.055) 
32.13 
(0.002) 
4.31 
(0.005) 
Hausman 
Test5 
71.76 
(0.000) 
28.71 
(0.014) 
41.12 
(0.000) 
5.14 
(0.953) 
4.51 
(0.972) 
14.99 
(0.242) 
17.65 
(0.024) 
9.72 
(0.205) 
29.83 
(0.000) 
Endogeneity
Test6 
8.50 
(0.862)  
0.98 
(0.999)       
R2 65.026 36.614 63.840 11.893 15.584 3.137 70.426 53.07 65.722 
Observat. 216 144 148 94 106 108 38 36 50 
1***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value  0.10. In parenthesis Standard Deviations. See the definition of the variables in the text. 
2 This Q-ratio is not advanced by one period 
3 Maximum-likelihood estimation (to improve the fitness of the model). 
4 Statistics and p-values of fitness of the models. In the fixed-effect estimation is the F statistics. For the random-effect estimation it is the X2  
statistics. 
5 X2  statistics and p -value for the Hausman Test. 
6 X2  statistics and p -value for the Sargan Test (p-value>0.10 reveals that there is no endogeneity). 
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FOOTNOTES  
2 Since the original paper of Berle and Means (1932) there have been a vast amount of papers that have studied different 
types of ownership structure and their impact on a firm’s performance. 
3 As financial institutions we denote banks as well as Saving & Loans. 
4 Zoido (1998) finds no relationship using accounting measures, while a positive relationship using market data. 
5 These authors find a negative relationship when banks’ ownership is not quite high. 
6 This study shows that banks use their bargaining power to charge above market rates from those bank-participated firms. 
7 Zoido (1998) finds a non-significant relationship when accounting measures are used, but a positive relationship when 
market measures are used. 
8 This author finds a positive relation for independent Japanese firms, but this is not the case for firms that are members 
of corporate groups (keiretsu). 
9 Financial firms are omitted, as well as those that show inconsistencies in their balance sheet. 
10 We denote the two largest blockholders as controlling blockholders henceforth. 
11 In our sample, family firms are underrepresented. The “problem” is that many families participate indirectly in a firm’s 
ownership through the stakes in other firms. Our focus on direct participation generates and overrepresentation of other 
firms’ stakes and underrepresentation of family firms. 
12 Henceforth, we use the word banks to refer to financial institutions (banks and Saving & Loans). 
13 If the unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with explanatory variables, we have to perform a fixed-effects 
estimation. But, if is not correlated with the explanatory variables, unconditional inference like that of the composed 
error method (random effects) is the most efficient alternative (Arellano and Bover, 1990). 
14 The Hausman test studies whether systematic differences exist between those coefficients of the fixed-effect 
estimation and those of the random-effects estimations. Particularly, the null hypothesis is that coefficients in both 
models have no systematic differences. If this null hypothesis is rejected, the only consistent estimator is the fixed-
effects one. If not, the best alternative to use is the random-effect estimation. 
15 The way we implement this is by testing systematic differences in the coefficients of two estimations on OWN2. First, 
an equation where the potential endogenous variable (ROA) is lagged by one period (the instrument). Second, an 
equation without instruments. If the test of the difference between both sets of coefficients is different from zero, in that 
case there is endogeneity. We should mention that if the first type of endogeneity exists (this is not our case), the test is 
the same but the equations are different. The first equation includes variables in differences and the potential endogenous 
variable (ROA) is lagged by two periods (note that variables in differences include those lagged one period). The second 
equation just incorporates variables in differences. 
16 Also, we have conducted tests of multicollinearity with negative results. 
17 For coalition NBB=1 the coefficient is less negative than that of BB=1 and BNB=1 coalition types. This is consistent 
with ROA estimations, where transitional analysis shows only effects for BB=1 and BNB=1. 
18 We have also conducted different estimations making use of the stakes of differet large blockholders as the dependent 
variable. The results do not change from those shown in Table X. 
19 Consistently with this non-significant result on NBNB_NBB, in the ROA estimation we are going to see that there is 
no effect on a firm’s returns when a bank enters as a second main blockholder in a firm without banks as main 
blockholders. 
20 When we analyze a firm’s returns making use of market data (Table XIII), the effects are significant in the same 
period for some estimations. 
21 In the OWN2 estimation this was reflected in the non-endogenous outcome of ROA. 
22 We should mention that the non-significant effect of concentration (OWN2) on a firm’s ROA is consistent with other 
studies like Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). However, these authors justify this result by invoking endogenous issues. 
23 In that case the variable that measures a firm’s returns is not lead one period. 
24 The only exception is the case NBNB_NBB in Table XII. 
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